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Abstract
As the Latin American sovereign debt crisis spread through the continent during the early
1980s, foreign investors began to abandon Uruguay out of fear that it would devalue its
currency like Argentina did in March 1981. Five small- to medium-sized commercial banks
in Uruguay faced solvency crises as a result. Although the Central Bank of Uruguay (CBU)
decided that a full, direct intervention into the failed banks was not necessary due to their
size, the CBU arranged for the sale of the banks to foreign financial institutions, while
assuming the non-performing portfolios of the failed banks to facilitate the transaction. The
CBU purchased about $416 million in non-performing loans, which were denominated in
both local and foreign currency. The CBU funded the purchases by issuing $311 million in
bonds and promissory notes (denominated in U.S. dollars) to the banks and writing off $105
million in previous financial assistance to the banks. Instead of creating an asset
management company to handle these non-performing assets, the CBU simply assumed the
portfolios onto its balance sheet. This move resulted in a lack of transparency on loan
recovery and discharge data, as well as several parliamentary and judicial investigations.
Despite forming a National Office of Asset Recovery in 1984 to facilitate loan recovery, the
CBU likely wrote off a sizeable portion of the non-performing portfolios every year as
operating losses after loan recovery results proved disappointing.
Keywords: Uruguay, asset purchase programs, Central Bank of Uruguay, broad-based asset
management

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based asset management company programs.
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Uruguayan Non-Performing Portfolio Purchase
Scheme
At a Glance
The beginning of the 1980s in Uruguay featured
increasing interest rates, an overvaluing of the
peso and steadily rising amounts of debt
denominated in foreign currency, which led to
substantial risk profiles inside the Uruguayan
banking sector. When the devaluation of the
Argentine peso occurred in March 1981,
investors abandoned Uruguay, assuming that a
similar devaluation could follow in the
neighboring country. This led to a decline in
asset prices, which meant that the value of
collateral on foreign currency-denominated
bank loans dropped significantly (PérezCampanero and Leone 1998).

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: The CBU arranged the sale of local
failed banks to foreign institutions, purchasing
the non-performing portfolios in the process, in
order to avoid “a banking panic and [ensure] the
maintenance of the stability of the financial
system” (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).
Launch Dates
Wind-down
Dates
Size and Type of
NPL Problem
Program Size
Eligible
Institutions

1982
Unknown
30.4% in 1982 (Caprio and
Klingebiel 1996)
Concentrated in the livestock
and industrial sector
Not specified at outset
Five failed privately owned
commercial banks
Closed-bank only
US$416 million acquired by
the Central Bank of Uruguay
Recovered 6.4% of the peso
debt and 1.8% of the dollar
debt as of end-1983
The CBU assumed the
portfolio onto its balance
sheet
Did not involve the creation
of an asset management
company and paid for a
portfolio partly denominated
in local currency with longterm dollar debt

As this financial crisis rapidly intensified,
eventually culminating in the devaluation of
the Uruguayan peso in November 1982, five Usage
small- to medium-sized banks faced serious
Outcomes
solvency issues in the beginning of 1982, as
banks lacked sufficient liquidity to meet
depositor
withdrawals
and
previous Ownership
government financial assistance failed to Structure
return the firms to solvency (Vaz 1988, 119).
The Central Bank of Uruguay (CBU) determined Notable
Features
that these banks did not require a direct
intervention and liquidation, as they were
smaller and not necessarily a systemic risk.
Instead, the CBU arranged for the sale of the
banks to foreign financial institutions, while purchasing the non-performing portfolios of the
failed banks in the process (Banda 1990). These portfolios were denominated in both
Uruguayan pesos and U.S. dollars. 65.1% of the acquired portfolios were denominated in
foreign currency. In order to finance the US$416 million portfolio purchase scheme, the CBU
issued US$311 million in bonds and promissory notes, denominated in U.S. dollars, to the
failed banks and wrote off US$105 million in previous financial assistance (PérezCampanero and Leone 1998).
Instead of creating a separate asset management company to take on the non-performing
assets, the CBU assumed the purchased portfolios directly onto its balance sheet (PérezCampanero and Leone 1998). These operations did not occur simultaneously but occurred
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on a case-by-case basis from April 1982 through early 1983 (Banda 1990). The CBU claimed
that this approach allowed the central bank to spread the losses out over many years and
recoup the financial assistance provided to the banks, as well as limit the possibility of a
banking panic since the failed banks were sold rather than liquidated (Pérez-Campanero and
Leone 1998).
The CBU also acquired some non-performing assets from other commercial banks who
agreed to lend the central bank foreign currencies to cover its foreign reserve shortage. Two
foreign banks, Bank of America and Citibank, sold 58 percent of the loans that the CBU
purchased under this program. These banks made significant capital gains since their
portfolio purchase occurred a month before the devaluation of the Uruguayan peso while
they simultaneously negotiated the Uruguayan external debt (Pérez-Campanero and Leone
1998). However, this second operation is not the focus of this case study.
The CBU did not indicate a designated timeframe within which they wanted to recover the
loans. The administration of the portfolios shifted several times after the CBU purchased
them, from the CBU, to the foreign banks that purchased the local banks, back to the CBU, to
a state-owned bank, and finally to a recently nationalized commercial bank (PérezCampanero and Leone 1998).
Summary Evaluation
Since the CBU assumed the non-performing portfolios onto its balance sheet, there is a lack
of transparency in data regarding loan recovery and restructuring, with the last publicly
released data on loan recovery coming at the end of 1984. For this reason, Pérez-Campanero
and Lopez (1998, 329) state that “the long-term impact of this purchased portfolio on the
accounts of the Central Bank of Uruguay is hard to assess.”
Of the data available at the end of 1983, the CBU had recovered just NUr$409.9 million
(6.4%) of the debt denominated in pesos and US$8.7 million (1.8%) of the debt in dollars.
Loan recovery increased to NUr$724.5 million for the peso debt and US$13.7 million for the
dollar debt by August 31, 1984, which is the final release of public data. Beyond 1984, PérezCampanero and Leone (1998) claim that the CBU likely wrote off a portion of the portfolio
every year, but the CBU did not confirm this.
Pérez-Campanero and Leone (1998) cite four major reasons for poor loan recovery results:
1) continued debtor insolvency; 2) a refusal to pay by debtors favoring loan amnesty; 3) a
weak judicial system that favored borrowers; 4) a hope that better future economic
conditions which would increase the value of collateral.
In the wake of poor recovery of non-performing portfolios in Uruguay, additional domestic
banks became insolvent and were taken over by a government-owned bank, leading to
government-owned banks holding 75% of deposits by 1987. In response, Uruguay passed
the Domestic Debt Refinancing Law in November 1985, which attempted to create a legal
framework for alleviating the debt burden of viable firms. This law created the Financial
Analysis Commission, which facilitated the rescheduling of debt and had the ability to
liquidate firms and halt dividends (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).
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Some in Parliament and the judiciary found irregularities in the portfolio purchasing scheme
and questioned the unique structure of the intervention. In particular, the usage of long-term
dollar debt to purchase portfolios partly denominated in pesos drew criticism (PérezCampanero and Leone 1998).
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Uruguayan Non-Performing Portfolio Purchase Scheme: Uruguay Context
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)

$9.179 billion in 1982
$5.102 billion in 1983
$3,107 in 1982
$1,716 in 1983
Data not available for
Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt)
1982
Data not available for
1983
Data not available for
Size of banking system
1982
Data not available for
1983
Data not available for
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP
1982
Data not available for
1983
Data not available for
Size of banking system as a percentage of financial
1982
system
Data not available for
1983
Data not available for
5-bank concentration of banking system
1982
Data not available for
1983
Data not available for
1982
Foreign involvement in banking system
Data not available for
1983
Data not available for
1982
Government ownership of banking system
Data not available for
1983
Data not available for
1982
Existence of deposit insurance
Data not available for
1983
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank
Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Key Design Decisions
1.

Part of a Package: The CBU purchased portfolios of non-performing assets from
insolvent institutions in order to facilitate their sale to healthy institutions.

The CBU purchased non-performing loans from five small- to medium-sized banks that had
failed, with the issuance of bonds and write-off of previous financial assistance, and then
assisted in the sale of the banks to foreign financial institutions (Pérez-Campanero and
Leone 1998). This operation is the focus of this case study, as it was intended to remove
problematic loans from the banking sector to prevent financial instability.
A second type of operation, which is not the focus of this case study, functioned instead as a
solution to the CBU’s shortage of foreign reserves. Under this operation, the CBU used
promissory notes to purchase portfolios with at least two-thirds of the loans classified as
good quality and, in return, banks lent foreign reserves to the CBU.3 Although the CBU
bought portfolios with some non-performing loans, that was not the sole purpose of this
operation, but rather a bargaining chip. Foreign banks, specifically Citibank and Bank of
America, were the primary sellers of these portfolios, at a disproportionate rate to their
involvement in the Uruguayan banking sector (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).
2.

Legal Authority: Decreto-Ley No. 15322 provided ex post facto justification for
the portfolio purchase scheme.

Vaz (1988) states that the CBU utilized Decreto-Ley No. 15322, passed in September 1982,
as ex post facto justification for the portfolio purchase scheme, since the first bank
intervention occurred in April 1982. In this new law on financial regulation, the CBU is
allowed to sell bonds as well as promissory notes to financial institutions under its lenderof-last-resort authority (Asamblea General de Uruguay 1982).
The Parliament, comptroller, and the courts all initiated investigations into the legality of
the portfolio purchase scheme. The CBU’s lawyers claimed that the pre-existing law was
vague on purpose, which encouraged the CBU to enjoy widespread powers (Vaz 1988). It is
unclear if the investigations resulted in any tangible results or punishments.

The CBU could have potentially raised foreign reserves through a sale of its gold, but it appears that foreign
banks, specifically Citibank and Bank of America, pushed for the implemented operation. Citibank and Bank of
America were also negotiating Uruguay’s external debt at the same time, which Pérez-Campanero and Leone
point out as suspicious and possibly the reason for the structure of this operation (Pérez-Campanero and
Leone 1998).
3
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Special Powers: The CBU does not appear to have had any special powers, but as
loan recovery stagnated and debt burdens increased, Uruguay ultimately
adopted debt-refinancing legislation

Since the CBU assumed the non-performing loan portfolios onto its balance sheet rather than
create a separate asset management company, there do not appear to be any special powers
involved in this scheme.
The CBU struggled to recover a significant portion of the non-performing assets likely as a
result of this lack of special powers to address delinquency. However, as loan recovery
stagnated and debt burdens increased, the Uruguayan government responded with the
Domestic Debt Refinancing Law in November 1985, which sought to alleviate the debt
burdens of viable firms and allow for the rescheduling of debt to allow for more borrowing.
The law created the Financial Analysis Commission, which served as the authority in
classifying and evaluating debtors under the new law. The commission had the power to
liquidate assets if the debtor became delinquent for over six months, as well as the ability to
halt dividends until the debt was reduced by two-thirds. The commission also determined if
a debtor qualified as a viable firm and was thus eligible for the automatic refinancing
provisions included in the Domestic Debt Refinancing Law (Pérez-Campanero and Leone
1998).
4.

Mandate: The CBU portfolio purchase scheme allowed five failed local banks to
avoid bankruptcy and sought to recover outstanding debts from the acquired
portfolios.

The CBU intended the non-performing portfolio purchase scheme as a method to avoid a
direct intervention into the failed banks (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).
5.

Communication: Information about the scheme appeared in several Uruguayan
newspapers, but the final mention of loan recovery data occurred in 1984, before
the full recovery or discharge of the assets.

Many of the newspapers and magazines reporting on the portfolio purchase scheme are no
longer in publication and do not have available digitized archives. However, PérezCampanero and Leone (1998) cite heavily from local newspapers, which seemed to report
detailed information on the announcement of the scheme and its progress. PérezCampanero and Leone note that the CBU stopped releasing data on loan recovery efforts on
November 11, 1984. Since the CBU simply took the non-performing portfolios onto its
balance sheet, there is a lack of transparency into the accounting for individual loans and
recovery process.
6.

Ownership structure: The purchase of loan portfolios by the CBU did not include
the creation of a stand-alone asset management company, but rather, the CBU
took the portfolios onto its own balance sheet.

The CBU preferred the structure of the portfolio purchase paired with the sale of the failed
banks to direct interventions by the central bank. The chosen approach allowed the CBU to
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maintain some level of control and prevent further panic because the sales happened on a
case-by-case basis, rather than having to schedule the direct intervention of the banks at
the same time. Additionally, this strategy allowed the CBU to spread out the losses of the
intervention across several years on its balance sheet, as well as recoup the financial
assistance provided to the insolvent banks prior to the intervention (Pérez-Campanero and
Leone 1998).
7.

Governance/Administration: The administration of these portfolios often
changed, from delegation to the BROU (a state-owned bank), to assumption by
the CBU, back to BROU, and, finally, to a nationalized commercial bank.

The portfolios involved in this operation routinely changed hands within the government,
since the CBU did not have the manpower or technical ability to deal with such large and
complex portfolios. The CBU transferred the administration of its private sector loan
portfolio, including the purchased non-performing assets, to the BROU, a state-owned bank,
in 1988. Parliamentary and judicial investigations into the takeover deals occurred due to
“irregularities” and the unique structure of the program; however, the outcome of such
investigations was unclear (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).
8.

Size: There did not appear to be a cap on the amount of non-performing assets
that the CBU could purchase, which ended up totaling $416 million.

The portfolio purchase scheme did not limit the amount of assets that the CBU could assume,
since the CBU assumed the entire non-performing portfolios of the banks on a case-by-case
basis. In total, the CBU assumed $416 million in loan portfolios from the five failed banks
(Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).
9.

Funding Source: The portfolio purchase scheme was government funded.

The CBU funded the portfolio purchase scheme through the issuance of bonds and
promissory notes. Additionally, the CBU wrote off previous financial assistance provided to
the failed banks in the form of loans (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).
10. Eligible Institutions: The portfolio purchase scheme involved several failed
commercial banks in the process of their sale to foreign financial institutions.
The five failed commercial banks did not comprise a significant share of the banking sector,
which explains why the CBU did not believe the situation warranted a direct intervention
(Banda 1990). See Appendix A for information on each bank intervention.
11. Eligible Assets: The CBU operation did not appear to have any limitations on
eligible assets, as long as the assets were non-performing and owned by the five
failed local banks.
The CBU purchased the non-performing portfolios from the five failed local banks prior to
their sale and did not appear to define what they considered eligible to be included in the
non-performing portfolios (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998). There does not appear to

111

Uruguayan Non-Performing Portfolio Purchase Scheme

Fulmer

be further information on the makeup and composition of the loan portfolios bought by the
CBU.
12. Acquisition – Mechanics: The CBU purchased loan portfolios through the issuance
of $311 million in bonds and promissory notes, as well as the write-off of $105
million in previous financial assistance.
The CBU issued bonds and promissory notes, denominated in U.S. dollars, to pay for the
acquired portfolios. The bonds issued by the CBU had a seven-year maturity, two-year grace
period, and an interest rate of one and a half points above LIBOR. Additionally, the CBU
wrote off $105 million in outstanding loans it had previously provided the failed local banks
in an attempt to resolve their insolvency (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).
The CBU used long-term dollar debt to purchase portfolios of non-performing loans
partially denominated in pesos, which the CBU defended this decision by claiming that
allowed the CBU to spread the monetary effects over several years and that banks refused
to hold long-term peso debt. The president of the CBU said that offering a cash payment
instead of long-term dollar debt would have just led to widespread purchase of dollars
(Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).
13. Acquisition – Pricing: There is no available information on how the CBU priced
the non-performing loan portfolios.
It is unclear how the CBU determined the pricing of the portfolios purchased from the
failed banks (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).
14. Disposal: The CBU underestimated the level of unrecoverable loans and
implemented several loan restructurings to encourage payment within the
acquired portfolios.
The CBU did not anticipate having as much difficulty recovering the loans in the portfolio as
it did, which led to greater costs to the CBU. Several measures were taken in April 1984 to
improve the recovery of assets in the loan portfolios. The government established the
National Office of Asset Recovery to streamline the recovery process. Additionally,
borrowers, regardless of which currency the debts were denominated in, were split into
two categorizations: high-standard and low-standard borrowers. In order to be classified
as a high-standard borrower, a borrower had to have paid at least 60% of interest accrued
in six months of 1983 and would have paid 60% of the interest for the whole year of 1983
by May 15, 1984 (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).
High-standard borrowers received several benefits, with the first being a write-off of 20%
(for local currency borrowers) and 40% (for foreign currency borrowers) of interest
accrued in 1983. Second, the maturity periods were extended. Third, high-standard
borrowers in local currency could convert their outstanding debt into indexed debt at a four
percent interest rate, with the adjustment factor being the lower of the change in exchange
rate or inflation rate. Finally, high-standard borrowers in foreign currency could similarly
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convert their outstanding debts into local-currency indexed debt, under the same
conditions as the borrowers in local currency (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).
All borrowers that made a payment 180 days before the due date, if this occurred before
September 30, 1984, were eligible to receive a write-off equivalent to the prepayment
amount, for up to 25% of the debt outstanding before the prepayment. If the prepayment
occurred after September 30, 1984, borrowers were eligible for a similar benefit, except the
write-off could only equal 15% of the debt outstanding (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).
Although in-depth public data was not available on individual loan recovery, PérezCampanero and Leone (1998) state that it is likely the CBU wrote off a sizeable portion of
the loan portfolio every year as an operating loss.
15. Timeframe: There was no announced timeframe for the portfolio purchase
scheme and the CBU stopped providing loan recovery data in 1984.
The CBU did not announce an intended end date for the disposal of the portfolios acquired
from the five failed local banks.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Individual Bank Portfolio Purchases
Local Bank

Foreign
Purchasing
Bank

CBU Purchase
in US$ million

Debt in
N$/US$/Both

Date

Banco
Panamericano

Banco Central de
Madrid

15.9

Both

4/22/1982

Banco de Litoral

Banco Santander

173.1

US$

9/19823/1983

88

Both

10/1982

Banca Federada del Banco Exterior de
Interior
Madrid
BAFISUD

NMB Bank

105

Both

Early 1983

Pemar
Sudamericana Casa
Bancaria

Banco de Italia

27

US$

n/a

Source: Banda 1990.
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